March 18, 2017


Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with joint promise. By virtue of said section, when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise.

For Example:

Adam, Bracken and Clarke jointly promise to pay Dhoni 3,000 USD. Dhoni may compel either Adam or Bracken or Clarke to pay him 3,000 USD.

It was held in Hazara Singh v. Narinjan Singh, (AIR 1929 Lah 783) that Section 43 applies only where two or more persons have made a joint promise have become jointly interested by inheritance in a contract made by a single person.

Similarly, each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract.

For Example:

Adam, Bracken and Clarke jointly promise to pay Dhoni the sum of 3,000 USD. Clarke is compelled to pay the whole. Adam is insolvent, but his assets are sufficient to pay one-half of his debts. Clarke is entitled to receive 500 USD from Adam’s estate, and 1,250 USD from Bracken.
Further, if any one of two or more joint promisors makes default in such contribution, the remaining joint promisors must bear the loss arising from such default in equal shares.

For Example:

Adam, Bracken and Clarke are under a joint promise to pay Dhoni 3,000 USD. Clarke is unable to pay anything, and Adam is compelled to pay the whole. Adam is entitled to receive 1,500 USD from Bracken.

However, nothing in Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act shall prevent a surety from recovering, from his principal, payments made by the surety on behalf of the principal, or entitle the principal to recover anything from the surety on account of payment made by the principal.

For Example:

Adam, Bracken and Clarke are under a joint promise to pay Dhoni 3,000 USD. Adam and Bracken being only sureties for Clarke. Clarke fails to pay. Adam and Bracken are compelled to pay the whole sum. They are entitled to recover it from Clarke.

Re, to Shaik Shahed v. Krishna Mohan (AIR1917 Cal 829) where it was held that Section 43 of the Contract Act can have no application where parties became jointly interested by operation of law in a contract made by a single person. It was in that case held that if the landlord brings a suit for recovery of rent without impleading all the tenants who are necessary parties, the suit is not maintainable.

Calcutta High Court in Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra & Ors., (AIR 1925 Cal 1056) observed that, Section 43 of the Contract Act will be applicable to the case of the co-heirs of the deceased is based on misapprehension of the scope of Section 43 of the Contract Act. It is quite apparent that the liability of a son for the debt incurred by the father is limited only to the extent of the share of the property inherited by him. Now one of the essential conditions for the applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act is that it is open to a creditor to sue any one or all debtors whose liability is joint and several for the recovery of the whole of the amount.

In Lukmidas Khimji v. Purshotan Haridas (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 700, Mr. Justice Latham expressly held that Section 43 of the Contract Act materially altered the rules of the English common law, and disallowed an objection by a partner defendant that the other partners should have been joined as defendants; and yet, while thus clearly recognizing that by reason of Section 43 a joint debtor has no right to have his co-contractors joined as defendants, the learned Judge nevertheless held that the rule in Kendall v. Hamilton (1879) L.R. 4 A.C. 504, would bar a fresh suit against the other partners.

In Motilal Bechardas v. Ghellabhai Hariram (1892) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 6 Mr. Justice Farran held in reference to Section 43 that "as far as the liability under a contract is concerned, it appears to make all joint contracts joint and several." If that is a correct view of Section 43, the doctrine of King v. Hoare, (1844) 13 M. and W., 494, is admittedly not applicable.

In Narayana Chetti v. Lakshmana Chetti (1897) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 256, the Court, following Lakmidas Khimji v. Purshotam Haridas (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 700, held that "it is not incumbent on a person dealing with partners to make them all defendants: he is at liberty to sue any one partner as he may choose." The Court expressly applied to partners not only Section 43 of the Contract Act, but Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates not to joint but to several and to joint and several liability.

In Rahmubhoy Hubibbhoy v. Turner (1890) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 408, Scott, J., in the first Court said that "Section 43 of the Contract Act IX of 1872 is not perhaps quite clear whether a complete adoption of the English rule is intended."

March 15, 2017


As reported in The New York Times, the Bill introduced in the House of Representatives on February 9, 2017 could have an effect of ending the Class action as an American Institution. Said bill was titled as the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017.

The bill was introduced to amend the procedures used in Federal court class actions and multi-district litigation proceedings to assure fairer, more efficient outcomes for claimants and defendants, and for other purposes.

The main purpose of the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 is to (a) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members and multi-district litigation plaintiffs with legitimate claims; (b) diminish abuses in class action and mass tort litigation that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal system; and (c) restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by ensuring Federal court consideration of interstate controversies of national importance consistent with diversity jurisdiction principles.

However, CHRIS SAGERS and JOSHUA P. DAVIS in their article titled “Proposed Law Could Be a New Attack on Civil Rights”, pointed out that, “If Congress kills the class action, many laws protecting ordinary people will become unenforceable. Nobody would pay a lawyer to bring most individual cases under our anti-fraud, product safety, antitrust, civil rights or employment laws, for example. The individual harm is usually small, though the policy is crucial and the overall social injury may be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

It was further observed by CHRIS SAGERS and JOSHUA P. DAVIS that, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act throws in a grab bag of other new provisions, most of them with little effect but to complicate or otherwise frustrate litigation. The consequence will be to make cases unattractive to the plaintiffs’ lawyers who shoulder the huge financial risks, and for the nonprofit organizations that bring many civil rights claims, leaving many Americans with no feasible way to enforce their rights at all.

According to them, if the Bill leading to the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 becomes law, that would end class-action lawsuits would be a disservice to the working class.

March 08, 2017



As discussed earlier, Administrative Law is a branch of law governing the creation and operation of administrative agencies. There are various reasons as well as factors responsible for the growth of administrative law.

Relationship between the Government authorities as well as the public: Change in the attitude of relationship between government authorities as well as the public is one of the main cause for the growth of administrative law.

Welfare state: Development of the concept of Welfare state is another cause for the growth of administrative law.

Inadequacy of legislation as well as judiciary is an another cause for the growth of administrative law.

Association of administrative and judicial functions is an another cause for the growth of administrative law.

Association of technical experts with the administrative organs is also a cause for the growth of administrative law.

March 07, 2017



Administrative law is considered a branch of public law. Administrative law is the body of law which governs the activities of administrative agencies of government. Government agency action can include rulemaking, adjudication, or the enforcement of a specific regulatory agenda.

Further, we can say that, the Administrative Law is a branch of law governing the creation and operation of administrative agencies. Of special importance are the powers granted to administrative agencies, the substantive rules that such agencies make, and the legal relationships between such agencies, other government bodies, and the public at large.

Similarly, Administrative law is a body of rules, regulations and orders formulated by a government body such as an environment management agency responsible for carrying out statute law.

In other words, these are the legal rules and principles on which courts act in controlling the exercise of statutory powers of adjudication and rule making by public authorities other than judiciary and legislature.

Administrative law encompasses laws and legal principles governing the administration and regulation of government agencies including Federal and State. Such agencies are delegated power by Parliament or in the case of a State agency, the State Legislature to act as agents for the executive. Generally, administrative agencies are created to protect a public interest rather than to vindicate private rights.



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